The shared assumption of the debate is that for the deliverances of sensibility to meet this requirement, they must possess a certain kind of structure or unity. The controversy concerns the issue of exactly wherein the required unity consists. More specifically, the question is to what extent the understanding must be involved in sensibility, if perceptions are to exhibit this unity. If we put the point in terms of the involvement in sensibility of conceptual capacities, we can characterize the debate in terms of the following alternative: possession by intuitions of the requisite kind of unity either requires the involvement of conceptual capacities, or it does not. The parties to the debate differ over which of these two alternatives is the correct one; and, as a foil to my own reading, I want briefly to flag the assumptions involved on either side.
The tendency is to assume that if intuition, in order to exhibit the requisite unity, does depend on the involvement of conceptual capacities, then the unity of sensory experience is the same as the unity of conceptual thought, in the sense that sensory experience is propositional in structure. Its content is conceptual; it has the same articulation as exercises of the understanding. And this sameness of articulation explains why intuitions can stand in rational relations to thought. 4 On the other hand, the tendency of those opposed to this view is to assume that if conceptual capacities need not be involved for intuitions to have the requisite unity, then we must recognize a distinctly sensory kind of unity. Advocates of this view hold that possession of this specifically sensory kind of unity is sufficient for intuitions to play the role required of them. What is more, they argue that the involvement of conceptual capacities in sensibility would actually prevent it from playing its proper role. For such involvement is incompatible with the specifically sensory nature of perception. 5 Rather than engaging this debate directly, my goal in this paper is to argue that Kant's own position offers a third alternative. As I will try to show, Kant, too, was concerned to develop a conception of the relation between perception and thought, or sensibility and understanding, on which it becomes intelligible how thought is answerable to intuition, in the sense that thoughts can be assessed as true or false in light of what is given in intuition. But his conception is specifically different from either of the two alternatives just sketched, and is therefore able to avoid their respective shortcomings.
The key to appreciating Kant's position lies in a proper handling of his notion of spontaneity. Accordingly, this notion is at the center of this paper. My claim is that a widely held view of what Kant means by calling the understanding "the faculty of spontaneity" is mistaken. Not only is there textual evidence against this view, it also leads to a distorted picture of how Kant conceives of the relation between understanding and sensibility. Once the proper conception of spontaneity is in place, however, it will emerge that Kant's conception of this relation constitutes a genuine alternative to the options just canvassed.
I shall proceed as follows. I begin by sketching the received view of Kant's conception of spontaneity. I then provide some textual evidence for regarding this view as insufficient, because it fails to account for what seems to be an integral feature of this conception. Since this feature can appear, on the face of it, to be rather implausible, my strategy in the remainder of the paper will be to ask what reasons Kant has for accepting it anyway. By identifying these reasons I hope to show that the presence of this feature in his conception of spontaneity is in fact well motivated. I end by considering an objection-one which serves to highlight some important features of Kant's conception of sensibility, which allow it to play the role that it does in his account of how thought can be answerable to the deliverances of sensibility.
SPONTANEITY AS JUDGMENT
Spontaneity, according to Kant, is the hallmark of the understanding, as the following passage, in which he characterizes the two basic cognitive powers of the mind, makes clear:
Our cognition springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of cognizing an object through these representations (the spontaneity of concepts). Through the first an object is given to us, though the second it is thought in relation to that representation (which is a mere determination of the mind). [...] If the receptivity of our mind to receive representations, insofar as it is affected in some way, is to be called sensibility, then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding. (A50f/B74f) 6 Sensibility and understanding, the passage says, are distinct cognitive capacities because they differ with regard to the way in which their respective representations are caused. Sensibility is characterized as receptive, because sensible representations result from, and thus depend on, the affection of the mind by something external. By contrast, the understanding is spontaneous, because it generates representations out of itself, independently of external causes.
Because the understanding is defined by Kant as the capacity for judgment, it has seemed natural to commentators to associate spontaneity with the capacity for judgment. 7 Thus, to exercise the spontaneous capacity of the mind is to make judgments. Accordingly, commentators have sought to explain the content of Kant's spontaneity claim by considering the distinctive features of judgment.
The view advocated by Henry Allison is representative of this approach. 8 Central to Allison's view is the idea that judgment must be construed as a "taking as." To make a judgment is to take something to be the case, for instance, to take some object a as being F. The point of this locution is that it makes explicit the requirement that, in making a judgment, the subject must be aware of the significance of its own act. In particular, the subject must be aware that its act contains a claim to objectivity, to representing how things are. How things are is independent of how they are represented as being, in the sense that representing them to be a certain way doesn't make it the case that they are this way. The representation may be true or false. If the subject is to be aware of the significance of its act, this means that it must have a grasp of the fact that its act is beholden to a standard of correctness independent of it in just this way. So a judgment must involve a grasp of the fact that things may or may not be as the judgment says they are, which means that it must involve an awareness of the distinction between what one judges to be the case, on the one hand, and what actually is the case, on the other. For judgment to include an understanding of its own significance is for it to be apperceptive, to involve a particular form of self-consciousness. In fact, Allison takes this to be the content of Kant's principle of apperception, according to which "the 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations" (B131). The crucial point for our purposes, however, is that, according to Allison, the apperceptive nature of judgment requires spontaneity. To take a representation as a representation of how things objectively are, it is not sufficient for this representation merely to occur in the mind as a result of sensible affection. Rather, the subject must take a certain stance towards its own representation, attach a certain significance to it. And the taking up of this stance cannot be explained, Allison contends, through the workings of merely receptive capacities. Sensible, i.e. receptive, capacities can explain that a representation with a certain content occurs in the mind. But they cannot explain the taking up of the particular stance involved in attaching objective significance to this representation. In Allison's words, Sensibility can present to the mind x's that are F's, but it cannot, not even in collaboration with the imagination, take or recognize them as such. This is the work of the understanding. In this respect, then, Kant's conception of spontaneity is an essential component of his account of the understanding, and particularly its distinction from sensibility. 9 Furthermore, the "taking-as" of judgment is identified with what Kant calls the synthesis of intuitions. Consider the following passage, where, commenting on Kant's identification of the understanding with spontaneity, construed as "the mind's power of producing representations from itself " (A51/B75), Allison writes:
The key to understanding this identification lies in Kant's further identification of discursive thought with judgment. […] What judgment 'produces' from itself is the representation of objects, that is to say, objectively valid judgments. The understanding is, therefore, spontaneous in the sense that it 'constitutes' objectivity or objective reference in and through the act of judgment, and it does this by synthesizing the manifold of sensible intuition in accordance with its own inherent rules (the pure concepts of the understanding). 10 In making a judgment, the passage says, the subject synthesizes a manifold of intuition. And since Kant holds that all synthesis is spontaneous, we in fact have here an identification of judgment and synthesis: judging is synthesis, and synthesis is judging.
TEXTUAL EVIDENCE
I believe that the strategy of explaining Kant's conception of spontaneity by focusing exclusively on the characteristics of judgment is mistaken. While it may be correct to say that Kant has a conception of judgment as "taking as," there is textual evidence suggesting that he recognizes exercises of spontaneity other than judgment. He seems to hold that there is a kind of exercise of spontaneity in sensible synthesis, which must be distinguished from exercises of spontaneity in judgment. If this is right, then the account of spontaneity that results from an exclusive focus on judgment is not just incomplete, though it is that. It also, and more seriously, leads to the false claim, widely accepted among commentators, that all synthesis takes the form of judging.
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As regards its quantity, the textual evidence pointing directly to exercises of spontaneity distinct from judgment is not plentiful. But this is partly compensated by its quality, by which I mean that some of it is very prominently situated. The central piece of textual evidence comes from the opening of the Transcendental Deduction in the B-edition of the Critique. This means that it is located at a crucial juncture in Kant's argument. The Transcendental Deduction constitutes the heart of the Transcendental Analytic, arguably even of the entire First Critique. It is here that Kant seeks to prove his central contention, that there are pure concepts of the understanding, whose application to objects is known a priori, and which therefore form the basis for synthetic judgments a priori. We can expect, therefore, that a claim advanced at this point in the text plays some role in the overall argument of the Deduction, and thus matters to the main concerns of Kant's project.
Here, then, is the passage in question, taken from the first paragraph of §15, the opening section of the B-Deduction:
The manifold of representations can be given in an intuition that is merely sensible, i.e. nothing but receptivity, and the form of this intuition can lie a priori in our faculty of representation without being anything other than the way in which the subject is affected. However, the combination (coniunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and, since one must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility, all combination, whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition or of several concepts, and in the first case either of sensible of non-sensible intuition, is an action of the understanding, which we would designate with the general title synthesis in order at the same time to draw attention to the fact that we can represent nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves, and that among all representations combination is the only one that is not given through objects but can be executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act of its self-activity. (B129f) 12 Kant here puts forth a general principle, which I call his Spontaneity Thesis. At a first approximation, we can formulate it as the thesis that combination cannot be given. Exactly what combination is will concern us later. For now we can simply note that the term is supposed to be equivalent to 'synthesis' , and thus concerns a topic familiar from the preceding parts of the Transcendental Analytic, in particular the concluding section of the "Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding," in which the Table of Categories is presented. 13 That Kant there calls the categories "pure concepts of synthesis" (A80/B106) makes it clear that the topic of synthesis, hence combination, is closely connected to his chief concern of establishing the objective validity of the categories.
Of combination Kant says in this passage that it is an act of the spontaneous faculty of the mind, the understanding. Hence the Spontaneity Thesis. What is important for my purposes is the fact that he goes on to distinguish between different types of combination. In particular, he distinguishes between combination "of the manifold of intuition" and combination "of several concepts." 14 Since the latter, combination of several concepts, must be judgment, the fact that he separates out the former as distinct from this implies that there must be a kind of combination which is not judgment. If we call this sensible combination, or sensible synthesis, we can take Kant to be saying that sensible synthesis constitutes a distinct kind of combination from judgment. The former is combination in intuition, the latter is the combination of concepts.
Before I present additional textual evidence, let me introduce some terminology. I want to distinguish between two ways of reading the Spontaneity Thesis. The first reading attributes to Kant the view that there is only one type of spontaneous act of the mind, and that is judgment. So on this reading, all exercises of spontaneity are acts of judgment. I call this the Single-Species View of the exercise of spontaneity: Again, I call a reading that takes Kant to hold this view a Two-Species Reading. As I said above, my goal in this paper is to develop a Two-Species Reading of Kant's conception of spontaneity.
In addition to the passage from §15, there are two main sources of direct textual evidence for the claim that Kant holds the Two-Species View. One is his essay "On the Progress of Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff" (written in 1793, though published only posthumously), the other is his correspondence with Jacob Sigismund Beck, a former student of Kant's who, at the time of the correspondence, was working on a book intended to make the Critical philosophy accessible to a wider audience. Consider first a passage from the Progress-essay:
Once the subjective form of sensibility is applied, as it must be if its objects are to be taken as appearances, to objects as the forms thereof, it brings about in its determination a representation inseparable from this [i.e. the determination, T.L.], namely that of the composite. For we can represent a determinate space to ourselves in no other way than by drawing it, i.e., by adding one space to the other, and so also with time.
Now the representation of a composite, as such, is not a mere intuition, but requires the concept of a compounding, so far as it is applied to intuition in space and time. So this concept (along with that of its opposite, the simple), is one that is not abstracted from intuitions, as a partial representation contained in them, but is a basic concept, and a priori at that-in the end the sole basic concept a priori, which is the original foundation in the understanding for all concepts of sensible objects.
There will thus be as many a priori concepts resident in the understanding, to which objects given to the senses must be subordinated, as there are types of compounding (synthesis) with consciousness, i.e., as there are types of synthetic unity of apperception of the manifold given in intuition." (Fortschritte, Ak. XX, 271) 15 Kant talks about 'composition' (Zusammensetzung) here, rather than 'combination' (Verbindung), but for our purposes the difference is irrelevant. According to the technical usage he defines in the Critique at B202n, combination (lat. coniunctio) is a genus whose species are composition (lat. compositio) and connection (lat. nexus), where composition is combination in accordance with the mathematical categories, i.e. quantity and quality, while connection is combination in accordance with the dynamical categories, the categories of relation and modality, including in particular the categories of substance-accident and causality. However, Kant's identification of 'composition' and 'synthesis' in the final sentence of the passage, along with what he says there about the pure concepts, suggests that he is using 'composition' in a wider sense, as referring to the genus.
What is of interest in this passage is that Kant refers specifically to the combination of spatial and temporal manifolds, and suggests that, in the case of space, combination is effected by "drawing." 16 While it may not be clear exactly how we should conceive of this activity, it does seem clear that it is not identical to judging. The "adding of one space to another," which presumably is what we do when we e.g. draw a line by moving a point, is clearly not something we effect by making a judgment. And this is evidence for the claim that there is a kind of exercise of spontaneity that is distinct from judging.
It might be objected that the reference to the categories-the "a priori concepts resident in the understanding" Kant talks about in the final sentence of the passage-points in the opposite direction. Since the categories derive from the logical forms of judgment, the fact that Kant associates synthesis with the categories might be taken to suggest that all synthesis takes the form of judgment, after all. As will become clear when I discuss the notion of a sensible mode of combination below, I think this objection is based on a mistaken view of the categories. The fact that the categories derive from the logical forms of judgment does not support the identification of spontaneity with judgment.
The following passages from the correspondence with Beck also contain evidence that Kant holds the Two-Species View of the exercise of spontaneity:
We cannot perceive composition as given. Rather, we must produce it ourselves: we must compose, if we are to represent anything as composed (even space and time). (Letter to J. S. Beck, July 1, 1794, Ak. XI, 515) 17 In my judgment everything depends on this: since, in the empirical concept of the composite the composition itself cannot be given by means of mere intuition and its apprehension, but only through the self-active combination of the manifold in intuition-that is, it can be represented only in a consciousness in general (which is not in turn empirical)-this combination and its function must be subject to rules a priori in the mind, which constitute the pure thought of an object in general (the pure concept of the understanding), by which the apprehension of the manifold must be governed, insofar as it amounts to one intuition; furthermore, these a priori rules constitute the condition of all possible empirical cognition of the composite (or that which belongs to it). On the common view, the representation of the composite as such figures, as given, among the representations of the manifold, which is apprehended, and does therefore not belong entirely to spontaneity, as however it really must, etc. (Letter to J. S. Beck, October 16, 1792, Ak. XI, 376) 18 The first passage is a concise statement of the general principle, the Spontaneity Thesis. Again, there is a reference to space and time, the forms of intuition. So here, too, Kant seems to be saying that the representation of, say, a spatial figure requires an act of combination. Since, again, it seems plausible to hold that it takes something other than an act of judgment to represent a spatial figure, the implication is that there is a type of synthesis, of exercising spontaneity, which is distinct from judging. 19 This is confirmed by the second passage, specifically by the repeated reference to intuition. Kant speaks of "the self-active combination of the manifold in intuition" (my emphasis) and of "the apprehension of the manifold […], insofar as it amounts to one intuition." Of particular interest is the last sentence, where Kant in effect admits that his view is counterintuitive, and thereby gives indirect support to the Two-Species View of the exercise of spontaneity. For the point about the common view, as he calls it, clearly concerns perception, the apprehension of sensory manifolds. Otherwise there would be no reason for the common view to suppose that the composite is given. So if Kant says, of this particular case, that even though combination may appear to be given, it is in fact due to spontaneity, he must be talking about exercises of spontaneity in perception itself, independently of judgment.
THE MERELY RECEPTIVE MIND
While there may be textual evidence favoring the Two-Species View, this view faces a number of problems. To begin with, while it may be plausible to suppose that judgment must be spontaneous, it is less easy to see why sensible combination should be spontaneous, as well. To make a convincing case against the Single-Species Reading, we should be able to identify the philosophical motivation for Kant to hold the Two-Species View. There are, however, at least two considerations suggesting that there is no such motivation, that combination should in fact be regarded as given. First, there is what we might call the phenomenology of perception. We seem to perceive all kinds of combination: we perceive things as standing in spatial and temporal relations; we perceive objects as bearing properties; we arguably even perceive causal interactions among objects. These are all kinds of combination which must fall inside the scope of Kant's thesis, given that they are kinds of combination governed by various categories (quantity, substance, and causality, in my example). Second, the claim that sensible combination cannot be given threatens to undermine the heterogeneity of sensibility and understanding. For sensibility is defined as the receptive capacity of the mind. What is sensible, this seems to imply, cannot be spontaneous. It must be given. So if there is a distinctly sensible species of combination, the very fact of its being sensible seems to entail that it must be given. If it is not, the strict separation Kant wants to uphold between the receptive and spontaneous aspects of the mind seems to break down.
There are, then, reasons not to attribute to Kant the Two-Species View. But if we want to take seriously the textual evidence pointing in the opposite direction, we need to ask what might nevertheless prompt him to hold this view, despite the apparent pressures against such a move. This is what I want to do in what follows. So my guiding question will be what reasons Kant has for affirming the TwoSpecies version of the Spontaneity Thesis and for holding that no combination whatsoever, including specifically sensible combination, is given. The strategy I shall pursue is based on the following thought. If sensible combination could be given, the receptive capacity of the mind would be responsible for it. We should therefore be able to understand the idea of sensible combination without reference to spontaneity. If this is right, then a merely receptive mind, that is, a mind not possessed of a spontaneous faculty of representation, should be capable of enjoying sensible combination as well; regardless of whether this would take the same form as in the human case-what matters is that it would be possible in principle. We can therefore make progress if we reflect on what a merely receptive mind can and cannot do. If it turns out that a merely receptive mind can in fact not enjoy sensible combination, we will have identified a reason for the Two-Species View.
The viability of this strategy depends on two conditions. First, we must have an independent grip on the distinction between a merely receptive and a finite rational mind; independent, that is, of any claims about combination. Second, we need to flesh out the notion of sensible combination. That is, we must know what counts as sensible combination. Now, it may seem that my example above shows that we already know this: sensible combination is combination in accordance with the categories. Although I will argue that this is correct, we need a more principled reason for this claim. Providing such a reason is the task of the next section. For the remainder of this section I will discuss the idea of a merely receptive mind.
To get the idea of a merely receptive mind into view, it will be helpful to start with the distinction between an intuitive and a discursive understanding; or equivalently, an infinite and a finite rational mind. An infinite mind is characterized by the fact that thinking that p and its being the case that p do not come apart. The reason is that through the act of thinking, the infinite mind creates the objects of its thought. As we can also put it, an intuitive understanding gives itself its own objects. Contrast a finite rational, or discursive, mind. Here the thought that p does not guarantee its own truth. The objects of finite thought are not created by it, but have independent existence. For this reason, a discursive mind cannot know through thinking alone whether the objects of its thought exist, and are as it represents them. It is this fact that, in Kant's mind, creates the need for a receptive, or sensible, capacity in a discursive mind. In addition to the capacity for thought, a finite mind needs a way of ascertaining whether the objects of its thought exist, and are as it represents them as being. This requires a receptive capacity of representation, a capacity to have representations of objects in virtue of being affected by them. Because affection by the object presupposes the object's existence, such a capacity is a capacity for knowing existence. Its receptive nature enables it to supply what a discursive understanding needs.
Based on this notion of a receptive, or sensible, capacity of representation we can form the idea of a merely receptive mind. This is a mind whose capacities are exhausted by the capacity for sensible representation. It was implicit in the foregoing that a sensible capacity is essentially object-dependent: it is a capacity to have representations of objects in virtue of being affected by them. For affection to take place, the object must be present. That is, the mind's (properly functioning) sensible capacities must be in a position to register the object's presence.
Whatever the precise nature of the representations which are generated in the subject through affection by the object, the idea of an object-dependent sensible capacity of representation is sufficient for us to ask what kind of cognition a being that has only sensible capacities is capable of, and to contrast this with the kind of cognition enjoyed by a being which is both sensible and intellectual, that is, a finite rational being with a discursive understanding. As I said, an object-dependent capacity of representation essentially depends on the presence of the object for its exercise. It can represent only what is currently within the reach of its senses. If we add to this what Kant calls the reproductive imagination, that is, a capacity to recall previously enjoyed sensible representations, we can say that a merely receptive mind can have representations either in virtue of present affection by objects, or in virtue of past affection by objects. Moreover, in various comments about animals, Kant claims that animals are capable of forming associative connections among the representations they enjoy. 20 Since he also thinks that animals have a receptive capacity of representation, but no intellectual one, we can add the idea of connection by association to the repertoire of a merely receptive mind.
The idea of association at work here is essentially Hume's: If representations A and B are repeatedly experienced together, a disposition is formed to call to mind one of them on the occasion of the other. Thus, if the subject has, say, a perception of A, it also represents B, even though B is not a content that is currently being perceived. 21 With connection by association added to the repertoire of a merely receptive mind, we now have three basic ways in which such a mind can enjoy representations: by being affected, by recalling past affection, and by forming, and actualizing, associative dispositions.
SENSIBLE COMBINATION
I suggested that the strategy of investigating why Kant might hold that sensible combination cannot be given by reflecting on what a merely receptive mind is capable of depends on two conditions. The first condition was that we have a grip on the distinction between a merely receptive and a finite rational mind independently of the idea of sensible combination, and I just showed that this condition is satisfied. The second condition was that we have an account of what sensible combination actually is. I now want to sketch such an account.
For this purpose, I want to introduce the notion of a sensible mode of combination. I will argue that this notion captures the idea of sensible combination that is at work in Kant's discussion of the Spontaneity Thesis. We can take as our clue the remark from §15, quoted above, that all combination is an act of the understanding, which is called synthesis (cf. B130). If we connect this with the claim from §10, that the categories are the pure concepts of synthesis, we get the idea that the categories constitute an inventory of the various forms that combination can take. This fits well with what Kant goes on to say about the categories in the Transcendental Deduction. He argues, first, that all combination presupposes the idea of a unity; second, that this unity is the synthetic unity of apperception, and third, that the categories articulate the unity of apperception. We can surmise, therefore, that the categories are, or are at least closely related to, the forms sensible combination can take. If this is right, we can determine what sensible combination is if we can say how the categories function.
The categories derive from the logical forms of judgment, as listed in the Table  of Judgments. We therefore need to begin by saying something about these. A logical form of judgment, in Kant's sense, is the way in which, in the basic case, two concepts are combined in a judgment. This sense of logical form is based on the notion of logical form familiar in traditional Aristotelian logic, as illustrated, for instance, by the square of oppositions.
To give an example, consider the judgments 'All swans are white' and 'Some swans are not white' . Because these two judgments contain the same concepts, Kant would say that they have the same matter. They differ only in respect of their logical form. In the terminology of Kant's Table of Judgment, the first is a universal affirmative categorical judgment, while the second is a particular negative categorical judgment. Because the logical form of a judgment, in this sense, specifies the way in which its component concepts are combined, I call the forms listed in Kant's table modes of concept-combination. Thus, 'universal judgment' is a mode of conceptcombination, as are, for instance, 'negative judgment' and 'categorical judgment' . 22 Kant defines the categories as "concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object in general is regarded as determined with regard to one of the logical functions of judgment" (B128). For present purposes, we can take the term 'logical function of judgment' to be equivalent to 'logical form of judgment' . 23 To say, then, that the intuition of an object is determined with regard to one of the logical forms of judgment is to say this: given the particular logical form of a judgment, there is a fact of the matter (i.e. it is "determined") as to which features intuitions must have, if they make the judgment objectively valid. In other words, there is a fact of the matter as to what must be the case with intuitions if the judgment is to be true or false. Let me elaborate on this.
First, the definition speaks of "an object in general." This means that the categories operate at a level of generality different from that of particular judgments about particular objects. They abstract from distinctions among objects, and pertain only to what it is for judgments to be about objects at all, regardless of distinctions among kinds of objects. But this means that what is at issue here is the objective validity of judgment in general. In Kant's terminology, the categories pertain to the form, as opposed to the matter, of judgment. As a consequence, we must also abstract from the matter of intuition, if we are to consider the objective validity of judgment at this level of abstraction. What this means is that we need to be able to say something about what it takes for judgments to be true or false in light of what is given in intuition, without attending to differences among kinds of objects. We need to be able to characterize intuitions at a level which abstracts from such differences. So we must identify those features of intuitions which correspond to the logical form of a judgment. Those features, in other words, in virtue of which intuitions satisfy the very abstract description 'giving objects to the mind' . Second, to "determine" intuitions with regard to the logical forms of judgment is to correlate sensible characteristics with modes of concept-combination. At the level of "object in general" these sensible characteristics must be formal in the sense that they are so general as to pertain to all possible intuitions, regardless of what kinds of objects they are about. I call these formal characteristics sensible modes of combination. So the categories serve to correlate modes of concept-combination with sensible modes of combination. Given the parallel articulation of the Table of  Judgments and the Table of Categories, this means that to each logical form of judgment there corresponds a sensible mode of combination.
Because of the essential heterogeneity of understanding and sensibility, sensible modes of combination have to be specified in terms belonging to the form of sensibility. Kant provides such a specification, in terms of time, the form of inner sense, in the chapter on the Pure Principles. Although we need not concern ourselves with the details of that doctrine, it will be helpful to illustrate the notion of a sensible mode of combination by means of an example. Consider the categorical form of judgment, the nexus of subject and predicate. The correlated category is that of substance and accident. Simplifying slightly, we can take this to mean that a judgment of categorical form represents its object as a substance bearing a property. But what is it for something to be a substance bearing a property? In particular, what is it for something of this form to be given in intuition? The correlated sensible mode of combination, specified in terms of the form of inner sense, time, provides an answer: A substance is that which persists through changes of its states. 24 Obviously, this answer would need much unpacking. But the basic point should be clear. A sensible mode of combination specifies, in terms of the formal properties of intuition, what it is for the object of a judgment with the correlated logical form to be given in intuition.
I will now argue that the notion of sensible combination we are interested in is exactly the notion of combination contained in the idea of a sensible mode of combination. More specifically, sensible combination, in the sense in which it is the concern of the Spontaneity Thesis, is precisely that which sensible modes of combination are modes of. I have already gestured at some supporting considerations above, when I suggested that we could glean from a consideration of § §10, 15, 16, and 20 the claim that the categories are meant to articulate the unity, which according to §15 is presupposed by any combination in the sense of the Spontaneity Thesis. But we can say more.
The main consideration concerns the cognitive function of intuition. Through intuition, Kant says, objects are "given" to the mind, while through concepts they are thought. 25 I take this to mean that thought is answerable to intuition, in the sense that a judgment is assessed as true or false in the light of what is given in intuition. Through the use of concepts in judgment, we assert that things are thus-andso. Through intuition we ascertain whether things are as we judge them to be. The object-dependence of intuition is the feature that makes this possible. Because an intuition is had only insofar as an object is affecting the mind, intuition constitutes what Kant calls the immediate representation of this object. In intuition, we might say, objects are directly present to the mind. Therefore, intuitions reveal to us how things are with the objects on which they depend.
If judgment is answerable to intuition in this manner, then intuition must be, as it were, tailored to judgment. That is to say, the basic structure of intuition must be such that judgments can be assessed as to their truth by reference to what is given in intuition. And this must be so despite the essential heterogeneity of intuition and thought. Using Kant's term 'unity' instead of my 'basic structure' we can put the point by saying that intuitions must be so constituted that their unity is the sensible analog to the unity of judgment. Only if this condition is satisfied can intuitions play the role of giving objects to the mind. And this entails that if intuitions do play this role, they must exhibit what I have been calling sensible modes of combination. The unity of intuition, therefore, is the unity of sensible modes of combination. 26 Further support for this claim can be derived from consideration of the goal of the Transcendental Deduction. The Deduction is intended to establish the objective validity of the categories, or pure concepts of the understanding. For the categories to be objectively valid is for them to apply to intuitions. In fact, since they are pure concepts, it is for them to apply to intuitions of necessity-which means that if the categories are objectively valid, there is no possible intuition to which they do not apply. Now, for the categories to apply to intuitions is for intuitions to have the properties the categories denote. 27 What are these properties? The answer is to be found in the definition of the categories, already quoted earlier in this section. According to this definition, the categories are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is regarded as determined with regard to the logical functions of judgment. Again, I take this to mean that a category relates an intuition to the logical form of possible judgments about it. Put differently, a category characterizes an intuition with regard to the logical form of judgments, whose content the intuition is. And as I argued above, the category does this by specifying, in its schematized version anyway, the sensible mode of combination the intuition exhibits.
We can now give the following argument. If the Transcendental Deduction is intended to establish the objective validity of the categories, and if for the categories to be objectively valid is for intuitions to exhibit sensible modes of combination, then the sense of combination at work in the principle about combination announced at the opening of the Deduction must be that of a sensible mode of combination. Therefore, the Spontaneity Thesis, the thesis that combination cannot be given, amounts to the claim that sensible modes of combination cannot be given.
AN OBJECTION
One might object to both of the arguments just given that they beg the question. They beg the question because in deriving the notion of sensible combination from judgment, that is, from a capacity characteristic of finite rational minds, as opposed to merely receptive minds, they already assume that combination is something a merely receptive mind is not capable of. For if the sense of combination is such that it is tailored to the unity of judgment, it is but a small step to the thought that combination depends on capacities a merely receptive mind is by definition not possessed of. And if this is so, then the strategy I am pursuing is pointless, because the answer to the question whether a merely receptive mind is capable of representing sensible combination is already fixed.
The first thing to say in response to this objection is that the notion of combi-
But if this is so, then my strategy for identifying the reasons Kant has for holding the Two-Species View is not circular. If the fact that the notion of sensible combination must be understood by reference to the unity of judgment does not by itself establish that sensible combination cannot be given, then the reason why sensible combination cannot be given cannot be that it must be understood by reference to the unity of judgment.
Nonetheless, the objection gets at something important. Let me try to bring this out by retracing my steps. The goal is to understand why Kant thinks that sensible combination, in particular, cannot be given. I suggested that we can make headway by considering what a merely receptive mind is capable of; in particular, by considering whether a merely receptive mind is capable of representing combination. This is informative with regard to our goal for the following reason: if combination can be given, then combination is something that sensible capacities can account for. And if combination is something that sensible capacities can account for, then a merely receptive mind is capable of exhibiting it. Because of this connection, we should be able to learn something about why combination cannot be given by considering why a merely receptive mind cannot exhibit it.
We must of course be careful not to end up saying something to the effect that a merely receptive mind cannot exhibit combination because it is not spontaneous. That would defeat the purpose of my strategy. And this is what the objection highlights. But if we have, first, a conception of what a merely receptive mind is which is more substantive than the merely negative characterization in terms of its difference from a spontaneous mind, and, second, a notion of combination which does not have built into it the claim that it must be spontaneous, then we should be able to give a more informative response. We should be able to say something of the form 'A merely receptive mind cannot exhibit combination, because combination is F, and a merely receptive mind can only do G; but G is not sufficient to account for F' .
The advantage of this strategy is that it will allow us to say why the claim, noted above, that we seem to perceive things as combined all the time does not pose an objection to the Spontaneity Thesis; why it is, in other words, compatible with the Two-Species View of the exercise of spontaneity.
COMBINATION AND THE MERELY RECEPTIVE MIND
We are now in a position to provide reasons, on Kant's behalf, for his commitment to the Two-Species View. I will argue that there are two such reasons. The first is simply that a merely receptive mind is incapable, in principle, of enjoying sensible combination. The second is that, even if sensible combination could be given, intuition could not play the role it has in Kant's epistemology, viz. that of "giving objects to the mind"; that is, thought could not be answerable to intuition. I will discuss these in turn.
First, then, let us turn to the contention that a merely receptive mind is in principle incapable of enjoying sensible combination. This amounts to saying that a capacity for object-dependent representation, on its own, cannot account for the presence of sensible modes of combination. To see why this is so, consider the following. Object-dependent representation, as I have defined it, is representation in virtue of affection by an object. In the fundamental case, it is representation in virtue of current affection. That is, the subject entertains a representation only because, and as long as, something is affecting it. Clearly, the content of such a representation is that which does the affecting, the object. 28 Now, if all the representations of which a merely receptive mind is capable are of this kind, then clearly these representations cannot exhibit sensible modes of combination. For a sensible mode of combination is, in essence, a particular kind of unity among representations. It is the unity apparent, for instance, in the idea that distinct representations, occurring at different times, are representations of one and the same persisting object. Or again, this unity is operative in the idea that numerically and qualitatively distinct objects, perceived on different occasions, are all instances of a single kind. Or finally, it is there in the idea that there are objects, and that an object is the kind of thing that has properties. Note that these are meant to be examples of the unity constitutive of sensible modes of combination. They do not amount to an exhaustive characterization. But they should suffice for conveying a sense of the kind of unity at issue.
The representations of a merely receptive mind do not exhibit this kind of unity. They fail to exhibit it, because object-dependent representation on its own lacks the resources to generate it. To see this, consider what resources are available to object-dependent representation. As we saw, in the basic case, the content of the representations characteristic of a merely receptive mind is exhausted by what is currently affecting the mind. Representations change as affections change. But this means that there is no space here for awareness of any connections between the changing contents. There is, we might say, a succession of contents, but no awareness of this succession. Awareness is restricted to the changing contents, and does not include the fact that they are changing, nor the awareness of any other relations obtaining between them. As Kant puts it, such awareness is "in itself dispersed" (B133).
It does not change matters if we add to the repertoire of a merely receptive mind capacities for reproductive imagination (memory) and associative dispositions (see above, §3). Reproductive imagination is the capacity to recall previously entertained contents. But if these contents did not include the awareness of the relevant kind of unity when they were first received, they will also lack it when they are recalled in imaginative reproduction.
Connection by association might seem to be more promising. But consider what this mechanism, as I have introduced it, really amounts to. The idea of connection by association is that if representations A and B are repeatedly experienced together, a disposition is formed to call to mind one of them on the occasion of the other. Thus, if the subject has, say, a perception of A, it also represents B, even though B is not a content that is currently being perceived.
There are several reasons why such a capacity cannot generate sensible modes of combination where there were none to begin with. First, the kind of unity that accrues to representations in virtue of associative connection is obviously far less complex than the unity of sensible modes of combination. As Hume makes clear in his discussion of this capacity, connection by association tracks spatio-temporal contiguity among perceived contents. It connects things that repeatedly occur at roughly the same time, and in roughly the same location. But it is clear that the unity at issue in the notion of a sensible mode of combination is a much more complex affair.
More importantly, however, connection by association operates, as it were, behind the subject's back. At least this is so in the case of a merely receptive mind. What associative dispositions accomplish is that some representation B occurs whenever representation A occurs, even when there is nothing present to generate B by virtue of affection. But this connection is not for the subject. The subject is not aware of the fact that B occurs whenever A occurs. It experiences first A, and then B (in a case of temporal contiguity, that is). It does not experience that there is first A, and then B. In other words, it does not experience the way in which A and B are related. It does not apprehend their unity. If this is right, then however complex the associative dispositions of a merely receptive mind may be, its representations will not exhibit sensible modes of combination. It follows that if the notion of combination at issue in the Spontaneity Thesis is that captured by the idea of a sensible mode of combination, a merely receptive mind is not capable of representing combination. The representation of combination does not belong to its repertoire.
THE FUNCTION OF INTUITION
I said that there is a second reason for Kant to hold the Two-Species View, one that derives from the cognitive function of intuition. The cognitive function of intuition is to "give" objects to the mind. I have interpreted this as saying that thought is answerable to intuition: Other things being equal, judgments are assessed as true or false in light of what is given in intuition. Now, for intuition to be able to serve this function, it must be possible for judgments to "correspond" to intuition. 29 That is, it must be possible for what is given in intuition to be as a judgment says it is, or not to be this way. Let me capture this point by saying that judgment and intuition must have the same unity. Again, the point is just this: if it is possible to evaluate a judgment as to its truth in light of what is given in intuition, then intuition must have a structure that allows for this kind of assessment. If a judgment represents some a as being F, then what is given intuition must, in principle, be such as to show that either a is F or a is not F. Again, the point is meant to be one about the basic structure, or unity, of intuition. It is compatible with the fact that the content of an intuition is generally more determinate than the content of a judgment.
I argued above that for intuitions to exhibit combination is for intuitions to exhibit sensible modes of combination. And for intuitions to exhibit sensible modes of combination is for them to have the same unity, the same basic structure, as judgment. For a sensible mode of combination is defined as the analog in intuition to the logical form of judgment. And the logical form of judgment constitutes the unity of judgment, in the sense that matters for our purposes. 30 Now assume, for the sake of argument, that combination can be given. Then the fact that intuitions exhibit sensible modes of combination would itself be something that can be given in intuition. Assume, further, that it is in fact given in intuition; moreover, that it is given in the case of all intuitions. In other words, the assumption is that all intuitions exhibit the unity of judgment, and that they do so as a result of affection.
In such a scenario, it would be a contingent fact that intuitions possess the unity of judgment. They might, at least in principle, fail to possess this unity. And this means that intuition cannot serve its cognitive function of being that to which thought is answerable for its truth or falsity. For if intuition is to serve this function, it must not be a contingent matter that intuitions possess the unity of judgment. It must be a matter of necessity. 31 That is, it must be something that can be known a priori. This follows from the fact that being truth-evaluable is constitutive of judgment, in conjunction with the fact that, for Kant, our only access to objects it through intuition. Let me elaborate.
Because our only access to objects is through intuition, judgments must be evaluated as to their truth in light of what is given in intuition. But if it is constitutive of judgment that it be truth-evaluable, it follows that it is constitutive of judg-ment that it "correspond to" intuition, in the sense that what it is for a judgment to be true is in part defined in terms of the intuitions that would make it true. And this of course requires that intuition is such as to be able to make a judgment true or false. Which is just the requirement that intuition exhibit the unity of judgment.
It follows that if judgment is possible, intuition necessarily possesses the unity of judgment. So the possibility of truth-evaluable representation-cognition (Erkenntnis), in Kant's use of that term-requires that all possible intuitions possess the unity of judgment. Put differently, in a being that possesses the capacity for judgment the unity of judgment must be a constitutive feature of the intuitions such a being enjoys. And this entails that it cannot be a contingent fact that intuitions possess this feature. It cannot be a fact which may or may not obtain. Therefore, that intuitions possess this unity cannot be something that is given.
The point can also be put as follows. To say that sensible combination is given is to say that it is the content of some range of actual intuitions. But to say that combination is constitutive of intuition is to say that combination enters into the very possibility of intuition. That is, combination is definitive of what it is for something to be a possible intuition. But if this is so, then whether intuition exhibits combination cannot depend on what is or is not given in actual intuition. Combination, we might say, must be in place already, "prior" to any actual acts of intuiting. It must be a priori in Kant's sense: a necessary and strictly universal feature of intuition. 32 So, again, the conclusion is that if combination were given, it would not have the right modal force.
THE PURE FORM OF SENSIBILITY
In each of the preceding two sections I gave an argument, on Kant's behalf, for the thesis that sensible combination cannot be given. The first argument is a simple modus tollens. If combination could be given, a merely receptive mind would be capable of it. But consideration of the notion of a merely receptive mind shows that such a mind is incapable, in principle, of representing combination. So combination cannot be given.
The second argument starts from the observation that sensible combination is a constitutive feature of intuition, and contends that if combination were given, it would not be constitutive of intuition. Put differently, the argument is that it cannot be a merely contingent fact that intuition possesses the unity of judgment. But if combination were given, it would be a merely contingent fact.
If this is right, we have good reason to think that Kant interprets the Spontaneity Thesis along the lines of the Two-Species View. However, the Spontaneity Thesis contends not just that combination cannot be given. It takes this claim to entail that combination must be "produced"; that is, that combination must be a product of spontaneity. One might object that, while my arguments establish that Kant has good reason to hold that combination cannot be given, they do not show that combination must be produced. What we lack is an argument to the effect that these two alternatives exhaust the available possibilities.
Put in this general way, this objection goes to the heart of Kant's "Zwei-Stämme-Lehre," his doctrine that there are two, and only two, sources of cognition. This is too large a topic to be treated within the confines of this paper. But we can give the objection a more specific focus, one which arguably makes it stronger, as well.
Central to Kant's doctrine in the Critique is the claim that there is a pure form of sensibility. This idea seems to contain everything we need to undermine my arguments in support of the thesis that sensible combination cannot be given. If so, then these arguments do not establish that combination must be a product of spontaneity. They show at most that combination belongs to the pure form of sensibility, as opposed to its (empirical) matter. Obviously, this would support the case for the Single-Species Reading of the Spontaneity Thesis.
Let me spell this out. We can take the thesis that there is a pure form of sensibility to mean that there are constitutive properties of intuition, which can be known independently of ("prior to") any particular act of intuiting. Thus, to say that space and time constitute the pure form of sensibility would be to say that intuitions necessarily have spatio-temporal properties, which pertain to them independently of what is apprehended in any particular act of intuiting. Now, part of the point of calling space and time forms of sensibility is that these properties pertain to intuition independently of the understanding. They are forms of sensibility, not of the understanding, and in accord with the Two Sources Doctrine, this seems to imply that intuitions exhibit these forms independently of any involvement of the understanding. The fact that Kant thinks that the schematism is needed to relate the categories to intuition supports this independence claim. The categories need to be schematized, because by themselves they bear no relation to the form of sensibility. Forms of the understanding, i.e. pure concepts, and forms of sensibility are, as Kant puts it, completely heterogeneous. 33 So, assuming that it can be established that what the pure form of sensibility accounts for is the right kind of combination, it seems that a pure form of sensibility possesses sufficient independence from the understanding to block the move from 'combination cannot be empirically given' to 'combination must be spontaneous' . Discharging this assumption should be relatively straightforward. Again, we may look to the doctrine of the schematism, and its implementation in the chapter on the pure principles.
The pure principles of the understanding relate the categories to the pure form of inner sense, time. 34 They specify the way in which intuitions instantiate the categories simply in virtue of the fact that they possess the pure form of inner sense. As I argued above, the categories signify sensible modes of combination. Being derived from the logical forms of judgment, they embody the unity of judgment. So intuitions that instantiate the categories exhibit the same unity as judgment. It follows that if intuitions instantiate the categories in virtue of their form, the fact that intuitions exhibit combination is due to the pure form of sensibility, rather than the spontaneity of the understanding.
In response to this objection, I want to make two points. First, I will argue that while the objection may have bite against the first argument I gave, it leaves the second argument untouched. That is, it has no force against the claim that the correspondence of judgment to intuition must be non-contingent. Second, I will argue that the objection highlights an important feature of Kant's conception of sensibility. This feature is connected to the distinction, explicitly drawn in a famous footnote at B160f, between the form of intuition and formal intuitions. I shall argue that we understand Kant's conception of the pure form of sensibility only if we understand this distinction. And once we understand this distinction, we will see that the objection loses its force.
Let me begin, then, with the point about the non-contingent correspondence of judgment to intuition-or rather, for our purposes, intuition to judgment. I argued that Kant holds that combination cannot be given partly for the reason that, if it were, it would be a merely contingent fact that intuition corresponds to judgment. The suggestion that combination in intuition is accounted for by the pure form of sensibility might seem to address this argument, because the pure form of sensibility is a priori, not empirical. This is to say that the relevant features are necessary and universal. It seems, therefore, that if sensible combination is due to the pure form of sensibility, the correspondence between intuition and judgment is non-contingent.
To make the case that this argument does not go through, I want to turn our attention to a comment Kant makes in §27, at the end of the B-Deduction. The comment occurs in the context of a discussion of how the necessary correspondence between experience and the categories can be explained. Before I turn directly to the comment, however, I want to point out that this is exactly the topic with which we are concerned. Experiencedepends on empirical intuition, while the categories stand for sensible modes of combination, i.e. for the sensible analog to the unity of judgment. So to explain how experience corresponds to the categories is in part to explain how intuition corresponds to judgment. More specifically, it is to explain why intuitions necessarily exhibit the unity of judgment. Now, Kant says that this necessary correspondence can be explained in only one of two ways. Either experience makes the categories possible, or the categories make experience possible. He rules out the first option, because that would turn the categories into empirical concepts. Consequently, the necessary correspondence is explained by the fact that the categories "contain the ground of the possibility of all experience in general" (B167). He then considers, and rejects, a third alternative. I want to suggest that what he says about this third alternative mutatis mutandis applies to the claim that sensible combination is due to the pure form of sensibility.
The third alternative Kant considers, in the form of a potential objection, is what he dubs a "system of preformation." In such a system, the categories do not make experience possible, nor is there a dependence in the opposite direction. Rather, experience and the categories are completely independent of one another, but are nevertheless in agreement. On this view, the categories have the status of subjective dispositions: they reflect not objective requirements of cognition, but the way our minds cannot help but operate. They express, as Kant puts it, a subjective necessity.
Kant rejects this alternative because it does not do justice to the necessity that characterizes the pure concepts, and it is worth quoting the relevant passage in full:
The concept of cause, for instance, which expresses the necessity of an event under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on an arbitrary subjective necessity, implanted in us, of connecting certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relation. I would not be able to say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object (that is, necessarily), but only that I am so constituted that I cannot think this representation in any other way than as so connected […] . (B168) 35 And this, he concludes, leads directly to skepticism; specifically to a Humean skepticism about the existence of necessary connections.
The first thing to note about this passage is that it turns on the idea of a noncontingent agreement between cognition and its object. On the alternative Kant is rejecting here, there is agreement, but this is a merely contingent fact. He suggests that this means that the source of the agreement is in the wrong place. It lies, in the terms of the passage, in the subject, rather than in the object, as it should. If we spell this out, the claim is that the reason why my judgment that a is F corresponds to the object, in the sense that it is either true or false of the object, must be that a is F (or that a is not F, as the case may be), not that I cannot help but judge in this manner. If I cannot help but judge in this manner, the fact that my judgments take this form does not rest on the right reason. It rests on what is, as far as cognition is concerned, an extraneous factor.
I said that this argument can be made to apply to the thesis that combination in intuition is neither given nor spontaneous, but rather due to the pure form of sensibility, which was the core of the objection I raised. The point of contact lies in the fact that the forms of sensibility, like subjective dispositions of thought, constitute a merely subjective requirement. They are merely subjective in the sense that they do not derive from the concept of an object of cognition. And this means that, although they are a priori, they are not necessary in the required sense.
That Kant recognizes the possibility of forms of sensibility other than ours is evidence for this claim. It shows that the fact that space and time are our forms of sensibility is a fact about human nature. And this means, in the first instance, that it does not derive from the objective requirements of cognition. not constitute a third alternative, which would block the move from 'combination cannot be given' to 'combination is spontaneous' .
At this point, it might be useful briefly to turn back to Allison, whose interpretation of Kant's Spontaneity Thesis I sketched in §1 above. For in light of the argument just given, we can see that a position like Allison's, too, is in danger of giving "the skeptic what he most desires" (B168), and that this is so regardless of whether such a position includes an appeal to the pure form of sensibility. The point is that if spontaneity is tied exclusively to judgment, then whatever structure intuition is said to have, this structure will not reflect objective requirements of cognition, but rather merely our subjective constitution. Now, Allison holds that intuition does not "give" objects to the mind unless it is absorbed into judgment. Which means that what is given in mere, pre-judgmental intuition is mere inchoate data. But if this is so, then the processing of intuitions into judgments starts to look like a subjective imposition, even if the structure of judgment itself derives from the objective requirements of cognition. For what goes missing in such a picture is the "correspondence" of judgment to intuition, the need for judgments to be answerable to what is given in intuition.
CONSTRUCTION IN INTUITION
I said that the objection discussed in the previous section brings to the fore an important feature of Kant's conception of sensibility, which is connected to the infamous distinction between the form of intuition, on the one hand, and formal intuitions, on the other. A full treatment of this distinction and the theory of sensibility on which it is based would require discussion of Kant's philosophy of mathematics, which is beyond the scope of this paper. What I propose to do instead is to provide a sketch of the notion of construction in intuition, which lies at the heart of his philosophy of mathematics. This will shed light, first, on how Kant conceives of the pure form of sensibility, and second, on what it might mean for sensible combination to be the product of spontaneity. Furthermore, it will enable us better to understand the reference to "drawing" a space in the passage from the ProgressEssay quoted in §2, above. As we shall see, the main idea is that the possession, by empirical intuitions, of spatio-temporal form depends on exercises of spontaneity. Obviously, if this is right, then Kant's own theory of sensibility lends support to, or is at least compatible with, the Two-Species View of the exercise of spontaneity. My purpose is merely to point out a number of connections, in order to suggest that the reading of the Spontaneity Thesis I am advocating fits well with Kant's theory of sensibility. To establish these points by argument would take substantially more work.
I shall first give a brief discussion of the footnote at B160f., before turning to the notion of construction in intuition. In §26 Kant attempts to complete the argument of the Transcendental Deduction by showing that the categories govern empirical intuition, that is, perception. If this can be shown, the objective validity of the categories has been demonstrated, because it has been established that nothing can be an object of perception which does not fall under the categories. The argument turns on the notion of the pure form of sensibility. In a nutshell, it is this: empirical intuitions are necessarily given in accordance with the form of sensibility; the form of sensibility is governed by the categories, because it exhibits categorial unity; therefore, empirical intuitions exhibit categorial unity as well, and are likewise governed by the categories.
Obviously, this argument goes through only if it is true that the form of sensibility exhibits categorial unity. In the following passage Kant argues that it does:
But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions which contain a manifold, and are therefore represented with the determination of the unity of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic). Thus unity of the synthesis of the manifold, without or within us, and consequently also a combination to which everything that is to be represented as determined in space or in time must conform, is given a priori as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension-not indeed in, but with these intuitions. (B160f) 37 To the first sentence he appends a footnote whose central claim, for our purposes, is this: Space, represented as object (as is indeed required in geometry), contains more than mere form of intuition; it contains, namely, comprehension of the manifold, given in accordance with the form of sensibility, into an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition gives only a manifold, while the formal intuition gives unity of representation. (B160n) 38 Let me simply state what I take to be the gist of the argument. We might put the point like this: Calling space and time forms of intuition is ambiguous. One thing we might mean by this claim is that space and time contain a structure, which accounts for the manifoldness of intuition. The idea is that e.g. being in different moments in time is a criterion of distinctness for the elements of intuition. It is what enables us to speak of what is given in intuition as being a manifold. However, another thing we might mean by calling space and time forms of intuition is that empirical intuitions necessarily have spatio-temporal properties; that they necessarily represent their contents as being in space and time. And to represent something as being in space and time, Kant suggests, is to represent it as exhibiting categorial unity.
This can be brought out by representing space itself "as an object," as Kant puts it in the footnote. To represent space as an object is, I take it, to represent particular spatial figures. For that is what geometers do. This contrasts with thinking of space as an abstract structure, a system of relations, which may be variously instantiated. Now, in representing particular spatial figures, that is, in representing space "as an object" in the way the geometer does, we represent space as exhibiting categorial unity. When we do this, we represent what Kant in the footnote calls "formal intuitions." I take the crucial point here to be that when, in empirical intuition, we represent things as being in space, we do exactly the same; that is, we also represent space as exhibiting categorial unity. And we therefore represent what is in space as exhibiting categorial unity as well.
We can also put this point by saying that space functions as the form of empirical intuition in the same way, at least in the relevant respect, as it functions in formal intuitions. Or rather, formal intuitions highlight a feature of space which is also present in the formal properties of empirical intuition, but which we lose sight of when we think of space merely as what Kant here calls a "form of intuition," viz. an abstract system of relations, of mere manifoldness. And this feature is the presence of categorial unity.
Why the representation of concrete spatial figures exhibits categorial unity, Kant does not say here. The argument, in a nutshell, is that we can represent spatial figures only by constructing them. And to construct a figure is to perform a synthesis in accordance with the categories of quantity. I do not want to discuss this argument here. Instead, I want to say something about the notion of construction. 39 Construction, we might say, is the step that takes us from the mere manifoldness of space, which "lies ready a priori in the mind" (A20/B34), to actual intuitions with spatial properties. It takes us from a potentiality to an actuality. Qua mere manifoldness, space is only a potentiality. And this is what depends on sensibility, what "lies ready a priori in the mind." But for this potentiality to be actualized, acts of construction are required. And acts of construction are acts of the understanding. They are acts of synthesis in accordance with the categories (specifically, the categories of quantity).
Construction, therefore, is the kind of exercise of spontaneity which effects sensible combination. It is distinct from judgment, the combination of concepts, but it cannot be identified with affections of sensibility. It is, rather, a distinct kind of exercise of the spontaneous capacity of the mind.
If this is right, it turns out that Kant's commitment to the Two-Species View is underwritten by his theory of mathematical construction, suitably extended to cover not just the categories of quantity, but the other categories as well. Some indication that this is indeed how Kant sees things is provided by the passages I quoted at the beginning of this paper as textual evidence that Kant is committed to the Two-Species View of the exercise of spontaneity. Both in the passage from the Progress-Essay, and in the first passage from the correspondence with Beck, Kant connects the statement of the Spontaneity Thesis with construction in space. He specifically mentions the drawing of a figure, as the paradigm case of construction, and claims that this is a type of act, which requires an exercise of spontaneity.
SENSIBLE SYNTHESIS AND THE UNDERSTANDING
Even if it is true that sensible synthesis is modeled on mathematical construction and therefore distinct from judgment, one might wonder why the exercise of the mind in sensible synthesis should be attributed to the understanding. The very fact that sensible synthesis is distinct from judgment seems to render this attribution doubtful, since the understanding is defined, after all, as the capacity for judgment. In conclusion, I want to make two brief points in response to this query, although again I will not provide much argument. First, it should be pointed out that, properly speaking, sensible synthesis draws into operation not just the understanding, but also the productive imagination; or, as Kant puts it at one point, spontaneity "under the title of imagination." 40 Given that the imagination is defined as the capacity to represent intuitions apart from current affection, this might go some way towards explaining the specifically sensible character of sensible synthesis. But it does not, at least not by itself, answer our question, viz. why this activity should nevertheless be attributed to the understanding.
Second, the unity of sensible synthesis is, as I have been putting it, the unity of judgment. More precisely, the unity of sensible synthesis, whose presence in intuition requires the exercise of spontaneity, is the sensible analog of the unity of judgment. It is important to see that there is what we might call a top-down dependence here: The unity of sensible synthesis takes the form it does because it is an analog to the unity of judgment. The unity of judgment is prior in the order of explanation. And this fact might take us a little further towards legitimating the attribution of sensible synthesis to the faculty that is defined as a capacity for judgment. The understanding, we might say, is the capacity to unify representations in a certain way. More specifically, it is the capacity to confer on representations the unity of judgment. If we start with this abstract characterization, we can go on to say that there are two ways of doing this. One is discursive, the other intuitive. One is the combination of concepts in judgment, the other is the construction of concepts in intuition. In the former case, possible intuitions are represented, through concepts, as exhibiting the unity of judgment. 41 In the latter case, this unity is generated in actual intuitions through the construction of pure concepts. As Kant puts it in a well-known passage: "The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition" (A79/B104). 42 11. CONCLUSION I hope to have provided some reasons for thinking that when Kant puts forth the Spontaneity Thesis, he is committed to the Two-Species View of the exercise of spontaneity. It has emerged that a full-scale defense of this claim requires close con-sideration of Kant's theory of sensibility as well as the concept of construction in intuition, which Kant discusses in the context of his philosophy of mathematics. To fully make the case for the Two-Species View, it has to be shown how the notion of construction, which in the case of mathematics involves only the categories of quantity, can be extended to the other categories in Kant's Table. A full discussion of this topic would require a detailed reading of the second half of the Transcendental Analytic. In addition, consideration is needed of how construction, or some analog to it, operates in empirical intuition. This is the theory of what Kant calls the synthesis of apprehension (cf. the passage from B160f quoted above). Only a worked-out theory of the synthesis of apprehension will be able to show whether Kant can maintain the Two-Species View without undermining the heterogeneity of sensibility and understanding; in particular, without undermining the receptivity of sensibility. But these are topics for other papers. My aim here has been the more modest one of sketching the basic interpretative framework within which such an overall reading of the First Critique might be situated.
At the outset of this paper I suggested that, at least in some of their recent work, the question of how properly to conceive the relation between sensibility and understanding has occupied contemporary philosophers working in a broadly Kantian vein. I briefly sketched the two sides of a debate over the question of what kind of unity intuitions must have if thought is to be answerable to them. One side holds that this requires an involvement of the full resources of the understanding in sensibility itself, and that this requirement is met because intuitions are propositional in structure, which means that the having of intuitions involves the exercise of conceptual capacities. By contrast, the other side holds that no such involvement of the understanding is needed: intuitions possess the requisite unity on account of the self-standing nature of the faculty of sensibility-one that it possesses on its own bat, without any sort of reliance on the understanding. But if what I have argued in this paper is right, it appears that the two parties to this debate overlook a third possibility-one that seems both philosophically viable and more faithful to Kant.
For we can now see that Kant's conception of spontaneity not only contains the material for elaborating a genuine alternative to these two positions, but that it is one which arguably avoids the shortcomings of either. In fact, we can characterize Kant's alternative as granting that both positions reflect a genuine insight, but that they each end up distorting this insight in a complementary fashion. For it has emerged that, if intuition is to have the unity needed for thought to be answerable to it, there must be some kind of involvement of the understanding in sensibility. The unity of intuitions, that is, cannot be completely independent of the requirements of cognition through concepts. On the other hand, we have seen that Kant does not take this requirement to imply that intuition must itself be conceptual all the way down. Rather, he seeks to satisfy the requirement by describing the unity of intuition as a sensible analog to the unity of judgment. The point is that, although the "correspondence" between intuition and judgment is non-contingent, the genuinely sensible character of intuition (hence the heterogeneity of sensibility and understanding) is duly respected and fully preserved.
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"[…]
Leibniz intellectualized the appearances, just as Locke totally sensualized the concepts of the understanding […] . Instead of seeking two entirely different sources of representation in the understanding and sensibility, which could judge about things with objective validity only in conjunction, each of these great men holds on only to one of them, which in his opinion is immediately related to things in themselves, while the other does nothing but confuse or order the representations of the first" (A271/B327 it is clear that this priority of intuition to thought is both cognitive and semantic. Thus an act of intuition can occur without any corresponding act of conceptualization, and also an intuition can be objectively valid independently of any concept" ("Kant and Nonconceptual Content," 259). 6. "Unsre Erkenntniß entspringt aus zwei Grundquellen des Gemüths, deren die erste ist, die Vorstellungen zu empfangen (die Receptivität der Eindrücke), die zweite das Vermögen, durch diese Vorstellungen einen Gegenstand zu erkennen (Spontaneität der Begriffe); durch die erstere wird uns ein Gegenstand gegeben, durch die zweite wird dieser im Verhältniß auf jene Vorstellung (als bloße Bestimmung des Gemüths) gedacht.
[…] Wollen wir die Receptivität unseres Gemüths, Vorstellungen zu empfangen, so fern es auf irgend eine Weise afficirt wird, Sinnlichkeit nennen: so ist dagegen das Vermögen, Vorstellungen selbst hervorzubringen, oder die Spontaneität des Erkenntnisses der Verstand." 7. "We can trace all acts of the understanding back to judgment, so the understanding in general may be regarded as a capacity to judge" (A69/B94). Part of Kant's point here is that, because con-
